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1. Introduction 
Biotechnology has long been presented as the exemplar of a networked form of 
organization (Casper 2007; Gay and Dousset 2005; Liebeskind, et al. 1996; Powell, et al. 
1996; Powell and Sandholz 2012) that is distinct from markets and hierarchies, grounded in 
trust and suited to advanced technology industries (Powell 1990). Dedicated biotechnology 
firms (DBFs) routinely form collaborative ties with diverse types of partners, thereby 
generating inter-organizational networks. An extensive literature celebrates how such 
networks promote learning, innovation and performance, giving rise to a virtuous cycle 
where networks promote innovation and innovation promotes networks (Baum, et al. 2000; 
Liebeskind, et al. 1996; Powell 1996). In contrast, this article presents an analysis of 
network failure, where collaborations produce not so much a virtuous cycle, as a dead end. 
Existing research highlights three critical challenges for DBFs in leveraging their 
collaborative ties to succeed. These challenges are largely sequential: first, accessing a 
science base that generates new knowledge and intellectual property (Swann and Prevezer 
1996; Zucker, et al. 2002); second, obtaining early funding for the timely development of a 
viable product (Bertoni and Tykvová 2015; Powell, et al. 1996); and third, navigating 
commercial and regulatory demands in taking the product to market (Powell, et al. 2005; 
Stuart, et al. 2007). Each challenge requires collaboration with other organizations that 
deliver complementary resources and expertise for resolution. While the challenges are 
interrelated, particular types of organizations are pivotal for particular challenges: most 
obviously, public research organizations for new knowledge, venture capital for product 
, a  a  a a  a a a  a  ( B  P a a )  
commercialization. 
This article describes and analyzes how biotechnology firms in Australia address 
the challenges of new knowledge, product development and getting to market, paying 
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particular attention to their collaborative networks between 2003 and 2014. Inspired by the 
literature on the network dynamics of biotechnology firms in the US (Powell, et al. 2005) 
and encouraged by diverse policy initiatives aiming to foster biotechnology in Australia, 
our project originally aimed to better understand the dynamics of growth among Australian 
firms (Ernst & Young 2006; Gilding 2008; Herpin, et al. 2005). Above all, it asked whether 
the network dynamics that informed the creation and success of US biotechnology clusters, 
most famously the Boston and San Francis  Ba  A a  (Nature 
Biotechnology 2007) also informed collaborations, clusters and networks in Australia. 
Beyond Australia, regional governments of many countries have a stake in this question, 
given their efforts to build biotechnology clusters and networks by policy design. A 
substantial literature maps their progress and challenges (Breznitz 2013; Fontes 2005; 
Gilding 2008; McKelvey, et al. 2003; Rees 2005; Trippl and Todtling 2007; Zylberberg, et 
al. 2012)  
This article builds upon these studies. Australia makes an ideal case study, as its 
policymakers have developed a portfolio of policies aimed at emulating the US 
superclusters. At the same time, its distance from potential and actual partner organizations 
amplifies the challenges for its regional clusters (Gilding 2008). We demonstrate that 
between 2003 and 2014 Australian DBFs adopted a similar network approach to success as 
observed in biotechnology clusters worldwide. We find that the collaborations formed by 
Australian DBFs with local PROs yielded benefits in meeting the challenges of creating 
new knowledge and raising funds for product development, but did not provide pathways 
for meeting the challenge of commercialization. W     a    
ab   a  a  (Powell, et al. 2012) with the capability to catalyze 
collaborations directed towards commercialization through deals with Big Pharma. Our 
findings indicate that the existing literature has been unrealistic about the prospects of 
regional clusters, distant collaborations and the benefits of networks far from t   
superclusters. 
In section 2, we introduce the literature on biotechnology networks and clusters, 
including the US superclusters, the trajectories of regional clusters worldwide, and the 
Australian experience in particular. Section 3 describes our analytical approach, integrating 
 
three elements allowing for triangulation of our findings: in-depth descriptive analyses, 
network visualizations and statistical modelling of longitudinal data. Section 4 presents the 
findings of our threefold analysis to illustrate the trajectory of biotech collaborations in 
Australia in meeting the challenges of new knowledge, early-stage funding and 
commercialization. Finally, we discuss the implications of the findings for our 
understanding of networked innovation in regional biotechnology clusters in section 5.  
2. Literature review 
2.1 Biotechnology networks 
Powell (1990) identifies networks as a form of organization distinct from market and 
hierarchy, where exchange depends upon trust. In turn, networks are especially suited to 
sourcing information through their connections between people and organizations. 
S a , a  a      a  a  b a  
  a , a   a  a   a a  (Powell 1990: 304). As a 
result, networks are of critical importance for high-technology industries in times of rapid 
innovation and uncertainty. During the 1990s and early 2000s biotechnology met these 
conditions in abundance and became the exemplar of a new networked form of 
organization (Casper 2007; Gay and Dousset 2005; Liebeskind, et al. 1996; Powell, et al. 
1996). 
Biotechnology refers to the use of biological sources, systems and processes for 
commercial purposes (Orsenigo 2001). In the 1990s and early 2000s it was commonly 
presented in Schumpeterian terms, as a mpetence-destroying a  built upon a 
different knowledge base to that of the pharmaceutical industry (Powell, et al. 1996: 117), 
giving rise to a b  . Since then, this heroic account has given way to a 
more incremental view, which describes how drug development increasingly demanded a 
wider and more dynamic knowledge base, including inorganic chemistry, molecular 
biology and immunology (Hopkins, et al. 2007; Nightingale and Martin 2004). The upshot 
was the proliferation of small DBFs, which forged interorganizational collaborations 
directed towards development and commercialization. In this context, biotechnology is 
often describ  a  a  a  a  a    , b a  the concept better 
 
captures the variety of organizations and actors that engage with each other across the 
extended product cycle (Powell, et al. 2005).  
Powell et al. (2005) describe the logic of collaboration and networks in 
biotechnology a  . F   , DBFs form partnerships with 
diverse organizations, including public research organizations (PROs), government 
agencies, venture capital, Big Pharma and other bioscience firms. These partnerships are 
directed towards diverse purposes at different points of the pharmaceutical value chain, 
including research and development (R&D), finance, complementary resources and skills, 
and commercialization. The establishment of one type of partnership fosters other types of 
partnerships (Miozzo and DiVito 2016), for example where ties with PROs facilitate 
partnerships with bioscience firms (Stuart, et al. 2007). 
Collaborations in biotechnology are not just a vehicle to access missing resources, 
but also for learning and innovation (Baum, et al. 2000; Liebeskind, et al. 1996; Powell 
1996). Rapid technological change means that no single firm can dominate the field on its 
own. Rather, innovation occurs across the network, at the interstices between DBFs, PROs, 
government agencies, venture capital, Big Pharma and other bioscience firms. For example, 
 a    a     a  a   
, a a    PROs, attracting talent and accessing external 
knowledge for innovation (Polidoro and Theeke 2012: 1135). In turn, firms develop their 
skills and routines for effective collaboration (Rothaermel and Hess 2007). The faster the 
learning, the better the performance  both because it pre-empts competitors addressing the 
same therapeutic needs and because the clock is ticking on patent protection (Hopkins, et 
al. 2013; Xu 2009). 
Collaborations are also vehicles for reputation, legitimacy and judgements around 
performance (Higgins, et al. 2011; Nicholson, et al. 2005; Stuart, et al. 1999). In turn, 
because situations defined as real are real in their consequences  a classic sociological 
dictum  network ties influence performance. This is especially the case in biotechnology 
because its business model makes conventional business performance measures, such as 
profitability and revenue, mostly irrelevant. Specifically, biotechnology firms direct their 
efforts towards building the value of their product pipelines with a view to deals with Big 
 
Pharma and profitable exits. In the absence of conventional measures, a   
 (a   ) a   a  a   ss. They include raising 
substantial risk capital (DeCarolis and Deeds 1999), successful completion of clinical trials 
(Fazeli 2004; Hopkins, et al. 2013) and deals with Big Pharma (Nicholson, et al. 2005). At 
a more modest level, patent applications and authorship of scientific papers allow firms to 
  a   a   a   a   b  (Polidoro 
and Theeke 2012: 1135), thereby contributing to market value (Simeth and Cincera 2016). 
More generally, partnerships across the board signal timely access to ideas and funds, 
reduced risk and promise of windfall gains. 
 
2.2 Biotechnology superclusters 
A powerful spatial logic informs biotechnology collaborations and networks. Above all, 
proximity facilitates tacit knowledge transfer (DeCarolis and Deeds 1999; Owen-Smith and 
Powell 2004; Swann and Prevezer 1996; Zucker, et al. 2002), which encourages start-ups to 
establish themselves nearby key partner organizations, most often PROs. Biotechnology 
worldwide is concentrated in the US. This is directly related to the three challenges; in 
particular, the US is an exemplar when it comes to continuous development of the science 
base, access to venture capital, and ease of movement between science and commerce 
(Pavitt 1998; Prevezer 2001; Senker 1996). In turn, biotechnology in the US is also 
concentrated around clusters. 
The US superclusters warrant particular consideration, because they shape the 
aspirations of regional clusters and policymakers worldwide. Powell and his colleagues 
map collaborations in the Boston and Bay Area between the formative years of 1988 and 
1999. In 1988 the Boston cluster was relatively sparse,    DBF  
ties with PROs, notably MIT and Harvard, allowing access to a rich science base (Owen-
Smith and Powell 2006). Partner organizations outside Boston, notably government 
agencies, venture capital and Big Pharma, were more diverse and offered benefits that were 
unavailable locally, including capital, specialist expertise and downstream support in new 
product development. A decade later, the regional network was more diverse and 
connected. DBFs now had ties not only with local venture capitalists, but also formed ties 
 
with each other, led by the most successful firms Genzyme and Biogen. In short, there 
occurred a transition from dependence upon PROs to a more market-oriented regime , 
where biotech firms played a connective role similar to the ones held by large companies 
in the trans-local network  (Owen-Smith and Powell 2004: 13). 
In contrast, in 1988 DBFs and their local partners in the Bay Area formed small 
disconnected components, most commonly around venture capitalists, and to a lesser extent 
around PROs such as Stanford. During the 1990s, ties with venture capital underpinned 
rapid growth and connectivity, supplemented by ties between DBFs, led again by the most 
successful firms, Genentech and Chiron. In contrast, ties with PROs remained secondary. 
By the end of the decade, venture capitalists a  a  a   a  
    , b   a      indicated 
that innovation mostly arose    a     b   b  
 (Owen-Smith and Powell 2006: 72). 
The Boston and Bay Area superclusters differed in what Powell et al. (2012) 
b  a   a  a . T   a  a  a a   a  a ,  a 
large department store in a shopping mall draws in customers who then patronize smaller 
a  . I   b  ,  a  a  a     
evaluation  in this case, world-class science, biomedical discovery, unmet medical need, 
or financial opportunity  and in so doing continually recombines and repurposes diverse 
a  (Powell, et al. 2012: 439). In the Boston region anchor tenants were PROs; in the 
Bay Area they were venture capitalists. 
There are common themes in the trajectories of the superclusters, 
nothwithstanding their differences. First, both locations featured outstanding PROs, which 
delivered the science base for new knowledge. Second, both locations featured 
sophisticated venture capital, which provided early-stage funding for product development. 
Third, both locations relied upon trans-local ties with Big Pharma in order to take their 
products to market. Their access to Big Pharma commercialization capabilities was 
facilitated by connections with PROs (Stuart, et al. 2007), Big Pharma  creation of local 
b a  (Cooke 2005; Porter, et al. 2005), and successful DBFs   to forge 
 
local ties with other DBFs, creating pathways between DBFs and Big Pharma for 
interactive learning and knowledge transfer. 
  
2.3 Regional clusters 
Since the mid 1990s regional governments around the world have forged policy 
frameworks directed towards emulating the superclusters. Their ambitions are 
overwhelmingly grounded in their PROs (Cooke 2007), which are a prerequisite of a 
successful cluster. In Portugal, for example, biotechnology firms originate in universities 
and research centres of the two major cities (Fontes 2005). In Sweden, co-location deals are 
most commonly between firms and universities (McKelvey, et al. 2003). In Austria, local 
universities generate most spinoffs (Trippl and Todtling 2007). In Israel, the industry 
congregates around leading research institutes (Kaufmann, et al. 2003). In Southern Italy, a 
regional university underpins the activity of most firms, both a  a    
knowle  and a   a      (Capaldo, et al. 2015: 1392). 
Some studies note that PROs on their own provide a poor foundation for 
biotechnology clusters. In the US, Powell et al. (2012) observe that regions dominated by a 
single type of organization, such as PROs, struggle to progress as clusters, perhaps because 
these organizations dominate at the expense of other players. In Italy and Europe generally, 
Orsenigo (2001) notes weak interactions between universities and industry. In Israel  
celebrated as  a  a   Breznitz describes the local life sciences cluster, unlike 
ICT, a  a -ba  ,   PROs. In turn, investment by venture 
a a   a , a    a a   b   a   R&D a ,  almost no 
a  a   , a a , a , a  a  a  (2013: 33-5). 
Whatever the case, regional clusters routinely experience lo a    a , 
expertise and money, above and beyond the local science base. These deficits extend much 
further downstream than those of the superclusters. As a result, regional governments and 
a  a  a    b   a  , a   
relation to early-stage capital (Hopkins, et al. 2019: 1113). The results are often 
disappointing: for example, Wong (2011) b     A a  a  
state  and Bertoni and Tykvová (2015) find that government investment vehicles in Europe 
 
have no impact on DBF invention and innovation (although they do boost the impact of 
private venture capital). 
Local deficits cause regional biotech firms to cast a wider net in their pursuit of 
trans-local and international collaborations. In Canada, for example, national and 
a a  ab a   b    a  a   ba  
a ,   a  a  a  a  a  a  (Rees 2005: 298). In 
P a ,  a   a a  in the positive sense in order to 
    a  a a a    a  (Fontes 2005: 917), 
including forging ties with distant venture capital. In Austria, cluster development depends 
 a      owledge, managerial know-how as well 
a   a a  a  a  ab  (Trippl and Todtling 2007). 
There are substantial challenges for regional clusters in forging trans-local and 
international collaborations directed towards later-stage commercialization. In Sweden, 
M K   a  a  B  P a a a   a a   a      
have m     S   , a  a  ,  
(2003: 498). In the UK, Hopkins et al. (2013) observe insufficient financial resources for 
UK biotech firms seeking to bring projects to late-stage development. In Portugal, Fontes 
highlights the importance of international mobility, a a     
individuals and organizations to more advanced  (2005: 915). In Germany, Al-
Laham and Souitaris (2008) identify network structures that promote international research 
alliances: specifically, clusters with many international linkages, R&D collaborations with 
local research institutes and national partners, and a central position in the national research 
network. 
A  a   a   a    ab   
prospects of navigating distant collaborations. Crevoisier and Jeannerat (2009), for 
a , a    a  a     a a  ba   
a    - a     b a a  . 
S a , B  a  W a  b  a   a    b  a  global 
 , a  a   b  ab   a     a a  
 a  a    a a   (2016: 223). For biotech firms, this 
 
demands absorptive capacity (Gertler and Levitte 2005: 487) and the ability to 
a  a      a  (Vale and Carvalho 2013: 1021). 
This literature focuses overwhelmingly upon the creation of new knowledge rather than its 
commercialization. It is uncertain whether precocious internationalism   -location 
 provide a foundation for commercially successful regional clusters. 
  
2.4 Biotechnology in Australia 
From the 1980s Australian governments  federal and state  adopted a neo-liberal policy 
framework, which privileged markets over government (Pusey 1991). In line with this 
policy, they sold major government enterprises, including CSL, a producer of vaccines and 
blood-related products. During the same period, governments adopted the vision of 
b  a  a   (Australia 2001; Dodgson, et al. 2011; Henderson 
2015; Victoria 2001). Consistent with the neo-liberal framework, this vision was guided by 
the principle of market failure: that is, government spending was directed towards activities 
in which it was believed that private firms were disinclined to invest (Dodgson, et al. 2011). 
Advocates of the innovation economy  politicians, policymakers, scientists and 
industry players  consistently promoted biotechnology as a particular opportunity for 
Australia. This wa   a     a  a  a ab  (Barlow 2010: 4; 
Petersen and Krisjansen 2015), exemplified by distinguished scientists (from the inventor 
of penicillin Howard Florey, to the inventor of the human papillomavirus vaccine Ian 
Frazer), Nobel Prizes (seven in medicine and physiology since World War 2), and world-
class public research organizations (such as Monash University in Melbourne, a pioneer of 
IVF technologies worldwide). The advocacy of Australia as a biotechnology hub reached 
its high watermark in the early 2000s. For example, a landmark federal government report  
Backing Aus alia  Abili : An Inno a ion Ac ion Plan fo  he F e  declared the 
a b    A a a  a  a ab ,   the flow of new ideas 
which underpin innovation, to create critical mass in leading research fields, and to build 
c  a a a   ICT a  b  (Australia 2001: 15). Similarly, the state 
government of Victoria announced its aspiration  b        
biotechnology locations by 2010 (Victoria 2001: 2). 
 
In turn, governments took measures to support the vision of a biotechnology hub. 
Above all, they concentrated their investment in research and development (strengthening 
A a a   ba ), on the basis that private firms under-invest in knowledge creation 
due to its inherently uncertainty and only partially excludability. High-profile initiatives 
included the launch of three new dedicated research institutes: the Institute for Molecular 
Bioscience at the University of Queensland in 2000, the Bio21 Molecular Science and 
Biotechnology Institute at the University of Melbourne in 2002, and the Australian Stem 
Cell Centre at Monash University in 2003.  
Governments also directed support to firms in the early stages of their 
development to help them survive the so- a  a   a . In particular, they 
operated a succession of direct grants programs and venture capital co-investment schemes 
(Cumming and Johan 2009; Cumming and Johan 2016). Government commitment to these 
activities  consistent with the logic of market failure  was      
, b  a  qualified, parsimonious and uneven. This was exemplified in a 
Productivity Commission (2007: 588) report, which concluded that the main direct grants 
scheme (Commercial Ready)  too many projects that would have proceeded 
 b   a a , whereupon the government axed it (McNaughton 2009). 
Similarly, a government-funded venture capital co-investment program called the 
Innovation Investment Fund was validated for its effectiveness in supporting firms that 
    and compared favourably with government venture capital 
programs in Europe (Cumming and Johan 2016: 56), but struggled to obtain legitimacy and 
scale (AVCAL 2017). 
Throughout the period, a small but steady stream of evidence-based research 
questioned     politicians, policymakers, scientists and industry 
players (Petersen and Krisjansen 2015). In the first instance, studies noted deficits 
pertaining to the fund-raising challenge, notably the underdevelopment of venture capital 
and the over-resort to IPOs as a substitute (Herpin, et al. 2005; Lerner and Watson 2008; 
Vitale and Sparling 2004). As firms and clusters struggled to progress, researchers 
identified a wider variety of deficits, including those pertaining to the challenges of new 
knowledge and getting to market. Barlow (2010) compared unfavourably the science base 
 
of the three main clusters in Australia (Melbourne, Sydney and Brisbane) with San Diego, 
one of the largest clusters in the US outside the superclusters. Gilding (2008) highlighted 
 a   a   a a  a -stage commercialization, as a result of which 
international collaborations with Big Pharma we  a -  a  , and thereby 
a  a  ab . More generally, Marceau (2007) questioned the effectiveness 
of government policy in addressing the science base, early-stage capital and 
commercialization. 
From the late 2000s, the promissory rhetoric of advocates for Australian 
biotechnology became more qualified, but nonetheless persisted. In 2011, for example, a 
government report from the state of Victoria described biotechnology as a vitally 
important  industry and an area of competititive advantage for the State, with the potential 
to make a major contribution to future economic growth and increased product  
(Victorian Government 2011: 6). Similarly, a 2016 industry report described biotechnology 
as  a    A a a  post-mining boom economic transition  a  a a  
contributor to A a a   (Grant Thornton 2016). Yet, there is a gap between 
rhetoric and reality. The prospects of Austrialian DBFs remain uncertain. This article is the 
first longitudinal study of biotechnology networks in Australia and provides a more robust 
foundation for regional policy-makers with ambitions of emulating the superclusters.  
 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Research design and data collection 
The design of this study draws heavily upon the landmark longitudinal research by Powell 
and colleagues in the US that mapped the trajectories of biotech firms, clusters and 
networks between 1988 and 2002 (e.g., Padgett and Powell 2012; Powell, et al. 2002; 
Powell, et al. 1996; Powell, et al. 2005). That project tracked the development of the entire 
US biotechnology field, but directed particular attention to the formation of the Boston and 
Bay Area superclusters (Owen-Smith and Powell 2004; Owen-Smith and Powell 2006; 
Porter, et al. 2005). Following the US project, we map the development of the entire 
Australian biotechnology field from 2003 to 2014. We start in 2003 because in this year its 
 
DBFs were roughly the same age, size and scale as DBFs in the US superclusters in 1988 
(Herpin, et al. 2005; Owen-Smith and Powell 2006; Powell, et al. 1996). In addition, we 
direct particular attention to the three main concentrations of biotechnology in Australia, in 
Melbourne, Brisbane and Sydney. 
W  a    US      DBF  a  endently 
operated, profit-seeking entities involved in human therapeutic and diagnostic applications 
 b ,  b       b a  ,  a  
processes. That is, we do not include firms in veterinary, agricultural or environmental 
b , b a   a     a ab  a  a    
 a  a  (Powell, et al. 2005: 1148). We assembled a list of all 214 
DBFs active in the time period under investigation amounting to 1592 DBF-year 
observations. We collected information on the DBFs and their collaborations from a variety 
of sources. Unlike the US project, there was no private industry directory available on 
which we could rely. Rather, all information was manually assembled from a range of 
sources, including the online membership directory of the peak industry organization 
AusBiotech, company websites, government reports, the business press and stock exchange 
reports. Patent information was retrieved from the EPO Worldwide Patent Statistical 
Database (PATSTAT). Information on scientific publications was collected from Web of 
Science, and journal impact factors (JIF) were obtained from the Journal Citation Reports 
provided by Clarivate.  
Following the example of Powell et al., we collected data on different types of 
a a a  ab a ,  a  a  a a  a   a   
  b  a b   a  a a  a a  (2005: 1149). We 
validated the assembled data on DBF collaborations through a survey of all biotechnology 
firms in 2004 (response rate 51 percent), 2007 (28 percent) and 2009 (18 percent). The 
survey consistently indicated that the public record over-states collaboration, presumably 
because firms are motivated to promote collaborations as signals of value creation, but 
unmotivated to promote their termination for the same reason. These dynamics informed 
   a , a     . O  s account, a 
 
conservative view of collaborations is adopted for all years under investigation, requiring 
strong evidence of a current partnership. 
We combine rich descriptive analyses, data visualizations and statistical modelling 
to provide a comprehensive analysis of how Australian DBFs addressed the three 
challenges, that is, accessing and creating new knowledge, raising early-stage funding, and 
commercialization. 
 
3.2 Dependent variables 
For our statistical models, we consider three distinct dependent variables, one aligned with 
each of the challenges that DBFs need to overcome. Concerning new knowledge and 
acquiring a science base, we follow Aharonson et al. (2008) a   DBF  number of 
patent applications in a given year as a proxy for DBF inventive productivity. Patent 
application rates do not necessarily reflect new product development output or 
commercialization (Trajtenberg 1990), b   a  a  a   DBF   
knowledge. 
With regard to early-stage fund-raising, we capture whether or not a DBF was able 
to forge a risk capital deal as a dependent variable. This variable was coded as 1 for a given 
year if a DBF entered a collaboration with a financial partner or made an Initial Public 
Offering (IPO), as both events reflect significant financing events for DBFs.1  
Concerning their ability to scale up and get to market, we investigate whether or 
not a DBF was able to forge a deal with Big Pharma in a given year as a critical value 
inflection point. To reduce potential endogeneity problems (Abdallah, et al. 2015), we 
introduce a time lag and measure all dependent variables in year t+1.  
 
3.3 Independent variables 
Following Powell and colleagues, we distinguish between different types of collaborations, 
delivering different types of resources and capabilities, specifically R&D, financial, 
                                                 
1 We aggregated the two because there were only 16 instances in which DBFs went public in the period under 
observation. Robustness checks using only agreements with financial partners yielded similar results to the 
ones presented in section 4. 
 
licensing, commercial and grants. In some instances, single partnerships deliver multiple 
resources and capabilities. In these instances, the partnership type is classified as 
commercial. Moving beyond Powell and colleagues, we also consider co-authorship of 
scientific articles as a type of collaborative partnership that signals science capability, 
enhances R&D productivity and highlights the uniqueness of innovations (Polidoro and 
Theeke 2012). Moreover, we distinguish between different types of partner organizations: 
PROs (including universities, research institutes and hospitals), financial institutions 
(principally venture capital), government agencies, as well as private bioscience firms, 
namely Big Pharma (all firms included in the Pharmexec Top 50 Pharmaceutical companies 
list between 2003 and 2014), second-tier pharmaceutical firms, overseas DBFs, and other 
bioscience firms. Finally, we have a category for other partner organizations, typically 
private non-bioscience firms and not-for-profit organizations.  
Further following Powell and colleagues, we classify DBFs by their location in 
Australia. All are located in (or occasionally nearby) major population centres: the state 
capitals of Melbourne (Victoria), Sydney (New South Wales), Brisbane (Queensland), 
Perth (Western Australia) and Adelaide (South Australia), and the national capital of 
Canberra (in the Australian Capital Territory). We also identify the relative location of 
partner organizations, distinguishing between local, interstate and international. Most 
studies, including the US project which provides the template for this study, distinguish 
between local and trans-local ties (e.g., Owen-Smith and Powell 2004). Local ties, which 
are characterized by propinquity and enabling face-to-face communication, generate local 
networks, commonly described as clusters. Trans-local ties are any ties above and beyond 
local ties, forging networks that extend cluster capabilities. Yet this duality obscures the 
difference between collaborations within the same jurisdiction  and thereby the same 
national innovation system  and those located in other national jurisdictions. As a result, 
the current study introduces a further distinction between interstate and international ties, 
which is especially relevant in the in  A a a   a a  b   a   
a  (Gilding 2008). This distinction captures not only the effects of national 
innovation systems, but also different degrees of geographic, jurisdictional and cultural 
distance in trans-local ties. 
 
We use these detailed distinctions in our descriptive and visual analyses. 
Moreover, we incorporate them into our statistical models as the following independent 
variables. First, we account for the overall number of collaborations, which reflects DBF  
network centrality (Powell, et al. 1996). We also consider the proportion of international 
collaborations of a DBF as well as network portfolio diversity a a  a  B a  
heterogeneity index (Blau 1977) accounting for the different types of partnerships (Powell, 
et al. 1996).2 Moreover, we consider partner popularity, calculated as the average number 
of collaborations formed by the partner organizations of a DBF with other DBFs in the 
sample.  
Based on the three challenges we identified, we further account for the following 
specific collaborative arrangements. Most relevant to the science base, we consider R&D 
collaborations and co-authorships  in an aggregated fashion as well as differentiated in 
terms of local, interstate and international collaborations. In a similar manner, we account 
for financial collaborations instrumental for the timely development of a viable product. 
We also consider whether DBFs received AusIndustry grants. Finally, we consider the 
number of DBF collaborative ties with other domestic DBFs and the number of their 
connections with international private bioscience partners  specifically, Big Pharma, tier 
two pharma, other biotech firms, and other bioscience firms  as potential drivers of 
commercialization success.  
For our statistical models, we followed previous research (Alnuaimi, et al. 2012; 
Jong and Slavova 2014) and calculated all independent variables described here by 
aggregating observations over a three-year window.  
 
3.4 Control variables 
To a      ba ,    DBF  a a  b   
publications weighted by JIF following the procedures described in McFadyen and 
Cannella (2004) and Toole and Czadmtziki (2010) and aggregating observations over a 
                                                 
2 We also calculated a diversity index for types of partners, which was highly correlated (r = 0.78) with our 
measure of network diversity for types of ties and, therefore, decided not to include both into our statistical 
models.  
 
three-year window. Moreover, we created a dummy variable to capture whether the founder 
of a DBF was affiliated with a PRO before or during the creation of the DBF as a reflection 
of academic entrepreneurship. 
We further control for DBF age measured in years since incorporation and for 
whether a DBF is listed on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX). In the absence of more 
detailed information, we control for DBF size as a dummy variable comparing (0) small to 
(1) medium to large firms. This distinction was determined using the selection criteria and 
classification systems adopted by Bureau van Dijk (MintGlobal database) and the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC), including assets, revenue and 
number of employees. We control for whether a DBF was active in (0) human therapeutics 
or (1) diagnostics and whether it belonged to the Melbourne, Sydney, or Brisbane cluster.  
Consistent with our dependent variables, we also account for the number of patent 
applications, whether or not a DBF was able to forge a risk capital deal or a Big Pharma 
deal aggregated over a three-year window. Table 1 provides an overview of all variables 
used in our statistical models. 
--- Insert Table 1 about here --- 
 
3.5 Methods of analysis 
Descriptive analyses include consideration of DBFs, partner organizations, partnership 
types and geographic location. Visualizations provide a vehicle to consider network 
structure, including main components, density and connectivity. All network visualizations 
were created using Visone 2.17. For statistical analyses we used Stata 14. 
Our sample for the statistical estimations consisted of unbalanced pooled cross-
sectional panel data with DBF-years representing observations. Due to the introduced lag 
structure, we needed at least four observations per DBF to specify our models. Therefore, 
175 DBFs (987 DBF-year observations) enter the statistical analyses. Following previous 
studies on the role of networks for innovation and using comparable dependent variables 
(e.g., Guan and Liu 2016; Liang and Liu 2018; Yayavaram, et al. 2018), we rely on a 
 
random-effects specification3 for our statistical models to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity. An advantage of the random effect specification is that it allows us to 
account for time-invariant predictors of our dependent variables. Moreover, as emphasized 
by Guan and Liu (2016) using a similar observation period to ours, the fixed effect 
specification can lead to biased estimates for panel data covering relatively short periods of 
time (Greene 2003). We estimate cluster-robust standard errors to adjust for potential 
within-firm correlation to account for the non-independence of repeated observations on 
each DBF.  
Our first dependent variable, the number of patent applications, is a count variable. 
As we observed overdispersion, we utilize negative binomial rather than a Poisson model to 
investigate the factors affecting Austra a  DBF  ab      ba  
challenge. Specifically, we run negative binomial panel models using the generalized 
estimating equation (GEE) algorithm to be able to include cluster-robust standard errors.4 
Risk capital and Big Pharma deals are measured as binary dependent variables. 
Accordingly, we rely on logistic panel regression. 
Descriptive statistics and correlations between all variables used in the statistical 
models can be found in Table A1 in the appendix. An inspection of the correlation 
 a   a  b  DBF  b   international private 
bioscience partners and their overall number of collaborations (r = .72) and the number of 
JIF-weighted publications and co-authorships (r = .90), raising concerns of 
multicollinearity. To further substantiate these concerns, we ran OLS regressions to 
generate variance inflation factors (VIFs) for all variables (Hair, et al. 2010). The highest 
VIF was 6.77 with an average of 2.40 (independent variables in Models 2 below) and 6.92 
with an average of 2.28 (independent variables in Models 3) for models including all four 
variables. When dropping collaborations with international bioscience firms and JIF-
                                                 
3 Many scholars employ a Hausman test to decide between random and fixed effects estimation (e.g., Gilsing 
et al. 2008). However, as detailed by Liang and Liu (2018), this approach is increasingly criticised as being 
neither necessary nor sufficient for deciding between random and fixed effects (e.g., Bell and Jones, 2015; 
Clark and Linzer, 2015). 
4 In STATA 14, cluster-robust standard errors cannot be computed for negative binomial panel regressions. 
Robustness checks using a pooled cross-sectional model specification with cluster-robust standard errors 
yielded largely comparable results. 
 
weighted publications, the highest VIF drops to 4.35 with an average of 1.99 (Model 2) and 
4.46 with an average of 1.99 (Model 3). Based on these figures, we decided not to include 
collaborations with international bioscience firms and number of JIF-weighted publications 




4. Firms, clusters and networks 2003-14 
In the following, we present the results of our threefold analysis, grounded in descriptive 
statistics, network visualizations and inferential statistics. We first describe the overall 
distribution and trajectories of Australian DBFs between 2003 and 2014. Then, we analyze 
how Australian DBFs were able to address the three challenges  access to new knowledge, 




Between 2003 and 2014, 214 therapeutic and diagnostic DBFs operated in Australia. In 
2003 there were 130; the number progressively rose to 167 in 2006 and then declined to 
104 in 2014. There were 84 startups and 110 exits across the period. Between 2003 and 
2006, startups exceeded exits, whereas from 2007 exits exceeded startups. 
All DBFs were located in or nearby six cities: five state capitals  Melbourne, 
Sydney, Brisbane, Perth and Adelaide  and the national capital Canberra. As illustrated in 
Figure 1, three-quarters of the firms were concentrated in the eastern seaboard cities of 
Melbourne, Sydney and Brisbane.  
--- Insert Figure 1 about here --- 
Startups between 2003 and 2006 were concentrated in Melbourne and Sydney; 
exits between 2007 and 2014 were concentrated in Melbourne and Brisbane. Overall, 
Melbourne was the main location of biotech firms across the period, peaking at 64 DBFs in 
2006 and bottoming at 40 in 2014. Brisbane tumbled from 34 DBFs in 2006 to 10 in 2014. 
 
Sydney replaced Brisbane as the second largest concentration of firms, peaking at 31 DBFs 
in 2006 and easing to 27 in 2014. 
During the same period, success indicators linked to the three challenges followed 
the same broad trajectories. Patent applications by Australian DBFs crashed, from 49 in 
2003 to four in 2014. The number of early-stage risk capital deals peaked at 27 in 2005 and 
bottomed at two in 2014. The number of firms in partnership with Big Pharma almost 
doubled from 16 in 2003 to 29 in 2006, but then fell to 23 in 2014. 
There were just three successful exits across the period. In 2007, the Melbourne-
based wholesaler Sigma Pharmaceuticals acquired Melbourne-based Orphan Holdings for 
A$107 million. In 2011, the Dutch bioscience corporation Qiagen acquired Melbourne-
based Cellestis for A$341 million. In 2014, the Irish Big Pharma Shire PLC acquired 
Melbourne-based Fibrotech for A$75 million. There were also some firms that promised 
breakthrough therapeutics; notably, Melbourne-based Biota (for avian flu), Acrux (for 
testosterone replacement) and Mesoblast (for regenerative stem cell therapeutics). Yet none 
of these firms delivered on that promise and in each case, their valuations declined 
dramatically after an ephemeral peak. 
 
4.2 Science base 
The science base is a pre-condition for biotechnology clusters to emerge and flourish 
(Feldman 2000; Swann and Prevezer 1996). Superclusters in the US are distinguished by 
outstanding PROs; more generally, clusters worldwide are underpinned by R&D 
collaborations and joint publications with local PROs. In Australia, a majority of DBFs 
originated in a PRO. Specifically, 133 DBFs (62 percent) had a founder drawn from a local 
PRO. Moreover, 72 DBFs (34 percent) actively engaged in the publication of scientific 
articles, of which more than a quarter were published in elite journals (among the top 5 
percent based on JIF for each year of observation). Between 2003 to 2014, they published 
687 papers, of which 88 percent were co-authored. Two thirds of co-authorships were with 
scientists from Australian PROs. Overall, 146 PROs nationwide collaborated with DBFs 
through different types of partnerships. Of these PROs, 51 were located in Melbourne, 45 
 
in Sydney and 18 in Brisbane. PROs were responsible for more than two-thirds of local ties 
with DBFs.  
B  a , PRO     a    . I  a a , 
major universities, such as Monash University (Melbourne), the University of Sydney and 
the University of Queensland (Brisbane), were the most connected organizations in each 
city. Following Owen-Smith and Powell (2004), we demonstrate the pivotal role of PROs 
for regional clusters by removing them from data visualizations of local collaborations. 
Data visualizations for 2006, the peak of biotechnology activity across the period, highlight 
how collaborations give rise to networks, forging pathways between DBFs. In Melbourne, 
78 percent of DBF  a  a ab    a    DBF  a  a  
organizations; in Brisbane, 79 percent are reachable; and in Sydney 52 percent are 
reachable. When PROs are removed from visualizations, this connectivity dissolves as local 
networks decompose into multiple disconnected components across all three clusters. This 
pattern becomes even more pronounced across the period. In 2014, the connectivity of 
firms largely disappears in the absence of PROs. Figure 2 illustrates this for the Melbourne 
cluster. For all visualizations, comparable figures for Sydney and Brisbane can be found in 
the online supplement. 
--- Insert Figure 2 about here --- 
Notwithstanding the dominance of PROs in local networks, DBFs also routinely 
forged ties with interstate and international PROs in order to access specialist capabilities 
as required. In 2006, for example, Australian DBFs had 227 ties with local PROs, 123 ties 
with interstate PROs and 109 ties with international PROs. On the one hand, the roughly 
equivalent number of trans-local ties (232) over local ties (227) highlights the search for 
specialist knowledge irrespective of location. On the other, the greater number of domestic 
ties (350)  local and interstate combined  over international ties (109) highlights the 
pivotal role of PROs in the Australian biotechnology field. Across the period, the number 
of ties with PROs diminished across the board, but the weightings of local, interstate and 
international ties stayed the same. 
Our statistical analysis highlights the importance of local collaborations, 
particularly co-authorships and R&D collaborations with local PROs, to access new 
 
knowledge. Table 2 contains the results of the negative binomial regression models for 
DBF patent applications as an indicator of their inventiveness. The Wald F2 statistics 
indicate that all models were highly significant (p < 0.01). Model 1 contains the control 
variables; Models 2 and 3 add the independent variables. Model 2 shows that the number of 
co-authorships with scientists from PROs significantly influences patent applications, but 
the number of R&D collaborations does not. Model 3, which introduces a distinction 
between local, interstate and international partnerships, shows that the number of local co-
authorships significantly influences patent applications. Domestic (local and interstate) 
financial ties also positively influence inventiveness. Otherwise, there are no network 
  DBF  inventiveness.  
--- Insert Table 2 about here --- 
 
4.3 Early fund-raising 
Local venture capital is a common theme among the US superclusters, but not among 
aspiring regional clusters worldwide. In Australia between 2003 and 2014, early-stage 
fund-raising was overwhelmingly a domestic phenomenon. Specifically, venture capital 
and other providers of early-stage finance operated at both local and interstate levels. At the 
local level, DBF ties with financial entities were the second most common form of 
collaboration, after PROs. At the national level, ties with financial entities were the third 
most common form of collaboration, after ties with federal government agencies 
headquartered in Canberra and ties with interstate PROs. Providers of early-stage finance 
were rarely international. In 2006, for example, Australian DBFs had 114 ties with financial 
entities altogether, of which 50 were local, 55 were interstate, and only 9 were 
international.  
The providers of early-stage finance were diverse, but public investment is a 
common theme. Consider, for example, the 41 domestic providers of early-stage finance in 
2006. Of 41 providers (concentrated in Melbourne and Sydney), nine (located in 
Melbourne, Sydney and Brisbane) were responsible for more than half of all ties. Of these 
providers, four were boutique venture capital firms, two were listed firms specializing in 
biotech, two were listed financial firms with a suite of investments, and one, the 
 
Queensland Investment Corporation (QIC), was a state government investment fund. 
Brisbane-based QIC was the single most connected provider of early-stage capital; 
Melbourne-based Uniseed, a university-funded boutique venture capital firm, was the 
second most connected; and two other boutique firms  GBS in Melbourne and Start-Up 
Australia in Sydney  were co-funded by the Australian Government through the 
Innovation Investment Fund. 
As illustrated in Figure 3, ties between Australian DBFs and domestic finance 
providers rose between 2003 and 2006, but thereafter declined. Throughout the period, 
networks arising from these ties were sparse, heavily dependent upon a few well-connected 
finance providers, such as QIC, Uniseed, GBS and Start-Up Australia. At the local level, 
these patterns were amplified, as additional visualizations for Melbourne, Sydney and 
Brisbane in the online supplement illustrate. Collaborative ties between DBFs and venture 
capital potentially presented opportunities for introductions to additional financial 
providers. Otherwise, PROs  through their pivotal position in regional clusters (Figure 2)  
had the potential to instigate connectivity within the network and bring emergent DBFs and 
financial providers closer together.  
Aside from support for venture capital, government agencies also provided modest 
support for early-stage product development in the form of direct grants. In the mid 2000s 
the federal agency AusIndustry was the most connected organization in the Australian 
biotechnology network through four different schemes. In 2006, it funded 64 DBFs 
(roughly one-third of all firms), concentrated in Melbourne (24), Brisbane (12) and Sydney 
(11). Some state governments also provided grants on a smaller scale. The closure of the 
Commercial Ready scheme effectively amounted to the withdrawal of government from 
direct grants for early-stage support. The number of federal government grants provided by 
AusIndustry fell from 64 in 2006 to zero in 2014, and state government grants fell from 18 
to six. By implication, the institutional logic of government support for biotechnology 
shifted further towards the creation of new knowledge at the expense of early-stage 
development of a timely product. 
--- Insert Figure 3 about here --- 
 
We use statistical modelling to investigate network effects  DBF  ab   
access early-stage financing. Table 3 presents the results of the logistic regression models 
explaining whether or not DBFs were able to forge a risk capital deal as required for the 
timely development of a viable product. The Wald F2 statistics indicate that all models 
were highly significant (p < 0.01). Model 1 contains the control variables; Models 2 and 3 
add the independent variables. Results indicate that financial collaborations and public 
listing at the Australian Stock Exchange increase the chances of risk capital deals. In 
addition, having a founder with a PRO background and collaborative ties to domestic DBFs 
a  a  a . O  a  a ,  a      DBF  
ability to forge a risk capital deal.  
--- Insert Table 3 about here --- 
4.4 Commercialization 
Clusters depend upon trans-local ties with Big Pharma for later-stage development and 
commercialization, but the most successful generate their own biopharmaceutical 
a  ( B  B ) and attract observatories from Big Pharma. Melbourne-based 
CSL, which is primarily a manufacturer of blood products and vaccines, is the only 
Australian Big Pharma included in the Pharmaexec Top 50 list, with more than 13,000 
employees in 27 countries. Over the entire period from 2003 to 2014, CSL had 
collaborations with 12 Australian biotech firms (five based in Melbourne), more than any 
other Big Pharma worldwide. Of these collaborations, seven (three in Melbourne) were 
directed towards later-stage commercialization. CSL  a   highlight the advantages of 
geographical proximity and its promise as a vehicle for commercialization. Yet CSL 
became no more embedded  locally or nationally  across the period. On the contrary, in 
2006 it had three commercial ties with three Australian DBFs (two in Melbourne) and in 
2014 it had none. 
In this context, DBFs turned their attention towards international partnerships, 
overwhelmingly concentrated in the US and Europe (as illustrated in Figure 4). Between 
2003 and 2006, the number of DBF international ties more than doubled, from 210 to 463; 
thereafter they declined to 350 in 2014, albeit more gradually than domestic partnerships. 
As a result, the proportion of DBFs with international ties rose from 40 percent in 2003 to 
 
69 percent in 2014, and the proportion of international ties rose from 34 percent of all ties 
to 56 percent in the same period. More than half of these ties were with private bioscience 
firms, mainly commercial; most of the balance were with PROs, mainly research and 
development. Only a tiny proportion of international collaborations were with Big Pharma. 
In 2006, for example, DBFs had 281 ties with private bioscience firms and 109 with PROs 
not located in Australia. Of ties with private bioscience firms, 42 were with Big Pharma, 43 
with second-tier pharmaceutical firms, 46 with other biotech firms and 150 with other 
bioscience firms. At the same time, ties with international bioscience firms and PROs 
presented potential pathways to deals with Big Pharma. 
 --- Insert Figure 4 about here --- 
Between 2003 and 2014, 65 DBFs  more than a quarter of all firms  forged ties 
with Big Pharma. In nearly all instances (58), their ties included commercial or licensing 
elements. As noted, Melbourne-based CSL collaborated with 12 Australian DBFs across 
the period, but Big Pharma in the US and Europe also forged multiple ties. GSK (London) 
collaborated with nine DBFs; Merck (New Jersey) and Merck AG (Germany) with eight; 
and Pfizer (based in New York), Johnson & Johnson (New Jersey) and AstraZeneca 
(London) with seven. In short, proximity facilitated ties, but distance did not prevent them. 
Across the period, a handful of DBFs seemed on the verge of breakthrough: for 
example, Biota (in collaboration with GSK, based in London), Acrux (with Eli Lily, based 
in Indiana) and Mesobast (with Teva, based in Israel). Yet none of these partnerships 
delivered on their promise. In turn, there were no Australian firms that progressed to 
become Big Biotech firms, in the manner of Genzyme in Boston and Genentech in the Bay 
Area, investing to form their own local ecosystems and anchoring their capabilities within 
these ecosystems. In close connection, Australian DBFs, unlike those in the US 
superclusters, barely formed local partnerships with each other. 
Notwithstanding active creation of international ties, data visualizations in Figure 
5 highlight how they did not generate network connectivity, in contrast to local and national 
ties. In 2003 ties with international bioscience firms were spread thinly. In 2006 a main 
   , b   a     single DBFs collaborate 
with a bioscience firm, which then collaborates with another DBF, which collaborates with 
 
another bioscience firm, and so on. In 2014, the main component persists, but includes 
fewer DBFs. Figure 5 also highlights the large number of isolated DBFs without 
connections to international bioscience firms across the period. In the online supplement, 
we present the respective visualizations broken down to the cluster level, where the 
observed fragmentation becomes even more obvious. 
--- Insert Figure 5 about here --- 
Table 4 presents the results of the logistic regression models predicting whether 
DBFs were able to forge a deal with a Big Pharma as a critical value inflection point for 
commercialization. The Wald F2 statistics indicate that all models were highly significant 
(p < 0.01). Model 1 contains the control variables; Models 2 and 3 add the independent 
variables. Few results are significant. The proportion of international ties increase the 
chances of scoring a Big Pharma deal. The effects for prior patent applications, risk capital 
deals and partner popularity are marginally significant and positive. Other than that, there 
are no network effects fostering commercial success. 
--- Insert Table 4 about here --- 
 
5. Discussion 
In this article, we identify three critical challenges for biotechnology firms: access to new 
knowledge and intellectual property, early-stage fund-raising for the timely development of 
a viable product, and commercial efforts aimed at bringing a product to market. In the US, 
firms   to meet these challenges (Powell, et al. 2005). In doing so, 
they create different types of collaborative ties with diverse partners to access 
complementary resources and cutting-edge knowledge in a field that no firm can dominate 
on its own. In turn, collaborations facilitate clusters and networks. In this connection, the 
US superclusters are characterized by local access to outstanding PROs and sophisticated 
venture capital, b    a   a a    a  a  a  with the 
legitimacy and capability to catalyze collaborations among diverse partners (Powell, et al. 
2012), including trans-local ties with Big Pharma (Stuart, et al. 2007). In the longer run, 
superclusters also benefit from local observatories created by Big Pharma and the tendency 
 
of successful DBFs to forge local ties with other DBFs, creating pathways for interactive 
learning and knowledge transfer. This is a virtuous cycle, where networks promote 
innovation and innovation promotes networks. 
The goal of this study was to apply and test the above logic for the Australian 
biotechnology field, which we trace over a twelve year period starting in 2003 when it was 
at a comparable stage of development to that of the US field in 1988 (Powell, et al. 2005). 
Based on in-depth descriptive analyses, network visualizations and statistical modelling of 
longitudinal data, we demonstrate that Australian biotechnology firms and clusters 
followed a distinctive trajectory. In particular, our analysis provides evidence that 
Australian DBFs adopted the same logic of multiconnectivity, forging collaborations with 
diverse organizations directed towards new knowledge, funding for timely product 
development and getting to market. Yet we find that multiconnectivity has no immediate 
benefits for Australian DBFs. Rather, the network effects for Australian biotechnology are 
specific to each challenge, in terms of partners, partnership types and location. In short, 
Australian DBFs adopt a similar network approach as DBFs in the superclusters, but do no 
achieve the same network effects. The upshot is that biotechnology collaborations do not 
produce a virtuous cycle (as per the superclusters), but rather a dead end. 
Consider the three challenges in turn. With regard to the creation and accessing of 
new knowledge, our descriptive and visual analyses show that collaborations between 
DBFs and PROs underpin regional clusters and domestic networks throughout the period. 
PROs produce more connectivity in Australian clusters between 2003 and 2014 than was 
the case in the fast-growing US superclusters during the 1990s (Owen-Smith and Powell 
2006). Our statistical models show that local R&D collaborations and local co-authorships 
positively influence new knowledge creation, but interstate and international collaborations 
and co-authorships do not. This is consistent with the literature, which identifies proximity 
as a pre-condition for the transfer of tacit and complex knowledge (DeCarolis and Deeds 
1999; Zucker, et al. 2002). In this sense, the regional science base in Australia generates 
network effects (consistent with the experience of the world superclusters), and PROs 
demonstrate potential as anchor tenants (consistent with the trajectory of the Boston 
 
supercluster). Overall, local collaborative networks support Australian DBFs in meeting the 
first challenge of creating and accessing new knowledge. 
Regarding early funding for the timely development of a viable product, our 
results shift attention from regional to national collaborations and grants. Our descriptive 
and visual analyses show that provision of early-stage funding for DBFs in Australia is 
dominated by domestic partnerships with financial entities, both local and interstate. These 
financial entities have strong ties with public agencies, including the government co-funded 
Innovation Investment Fund. Otherwise, in the mid 2000s the federal government agency 
AusIndustry is the most connected organization in the Australian biotechnology network 
(comparable to the central position of the National Institutes of Health in the US 
biotechnology network), until its main grant scheme is axed in 2007. Our statistical models 
show that AusIndustry grants are not conducive to risk capital deals however. In contrast, 
ties with Australian PROs (through local co-authorships and academic founders), domestic 
DBF collaborations and interstate financial collaborations positively influence early-stage 
funding. These findings demonstrate the dependency of DBFs on domestic partnerships for 
risk capital. They also highlight the distinction between engaged partnerships where partner 
organizations actively interact with each other, for instance exchanging strategic advice, as 
occurs in venture capital (including government co-investment schemes), and more 
transactional arrangements as exemplified by direct grants (Bertoni and Tykvová 2015; 
Cumming and Johan 2016). The influence of local co-authorships and academic founders in 
accessing risk capital confirm the potential of PROs as anchor tenants within the Australian 
biotechnology industry, extending beyond knowledge creation to early-stage funding. 
Moreover, the influence of interstate financial and domestic DBF collaborations suggest the 
promise of a larger national innovation system, where venture capital, government co-
investment programs and more mature DBFs facilitate network effects in crossing the 
a   a  a  a  DBF a -ups (Dodgson, et al. 2011; Herpin, et al. 2005; 
Marceau 2007). Overall, local and domestic collaborations support Australian DBFs in 
meeting the second challenge of accessing early-stage funding for development of a viable 
product. 
 
For the final challenge of commercialization, our results shift attention once more, 
from domestic to international collaborations. One reason for this is that there is just one 
multinational pharmaceutical corporation located in Australia. The fact that it has more 
partnerships with Australian DBFs than any other Big Pharma during the observed period 
confirms the benefits of proximity and the difficulty of collaborating at a distance 
(Boschma 2005). Our descriptive and visual analyses show that that as DBFs become more 
mature, they form relatively more international collaborations. These collaborations, unlike 
domestic collaborations, are thinly spread, giving rise to sparse networks. Our statistical 
models show, consistent with Al-Laham and Souitaris (2008), that the overall proportion of 
existing international ties improves the chances of forging Big Pharma deals. This suggests 
possible network effects but, given weak connectivity, may simply reflect  
a a  (Fontes 2005) in the form of punishing travel schedules and dogged 
effort. In short, local collaborations fail to translate local and domestic network effects that 
benefit knowledge creation and early funding into international network effects necessary 
for getting to market, and international collaborations fail to make up for it. 
Previous studies propose many different explanations for the disappointing 
progress of Australian DBFs, including the depth of the science base (Barlow 2010), 
underdeveloped venture capital (Barlow 2010; Vitale and Sparling 2004), misdirected 
government policy (Marceau 2007), and geographic distance from the headquarters of Big 
Pharma (Gilding 2008). The diversity of explanations reflects significant challenges at 
every point of the value chain. Our study directs particular attention to the gap between 
network effects in creating new knowledge and accessing early funding on the one hand, 
and taking products to market on the other. Australian PROs serve as anchor tenants in 
meeting the first two challenges, but not the third. In this sense, they are weak anchor 
tenants for biotechnology clusters in Australia. This finding is consistent with other 
research that highlights the limitations of PROs as anchor tenants (Breznitz 2013; Powell, 
et al. 2012) 
In particular, our study highlights the absence of network effects in securing deals 
with Big Pharma. The challenge of securing deals with Big Pharma can partly be 
     a   a  (Gilding 2008), but it is much more than 
 
this. It requires attention to institutions, facilities and practices that mitigate geographic 
distance, extending the reach of local and domestic organizations and their absorptive 
capacity. This might include local observatories (as found in the superclusters), 
international exchange programs between PROs and Big Pharma (designed to make PROs 
more robust anchor tenants), or incentive schemes for more mature DBFs to forge 
collaborations with start-ups (following the example of the superclusters). Such initiatives 
would demand public investment, patience to allow the long biotechnology product 
pipeline to take its course, and bipartisanship to survive the short-term election cycle. These 
conditions seem unlikely in the long-standing Australian policy climate, with its 
partisanship around industry policy, its narrow understanding of market failure and its 
intermittent engagement with the innovation economy agenda (Dodgson, et al. 2011).  
In conclusion, our analysis suggests that advocates of the innovation economy  
politicians, policymakers, scientists and industry players  have overstated their case for 
biotechnology as a prospective industry for countries far from the world biotechnology 
superclusters and Big Pharma. I   ,  a   a   
a   xcessively optimistic about the prospects of navigating distant collaborations 
a  b a a   a  - a   (B a  a  W a  2016; 
Crevoisier and Jeanneret 2009). Distant collaborations cannot seamlessly substitute for 
local deficits. Regional public research organizations struggle to catalyze collaborations 
with diverse partners across the entire value chain. Strategies to build absorptive capacity 
and embed distant capabilities are poorly understood. Collaborations do not automatically 
translate into virtuous cycles, and may become dead ends. The ambitions of regional 
policymakers and industry players have been mostly disappointed. We need a better 
understanding of network failure in order to fashion new industries far from the world 
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Figure 1: Regional biotechnology clusters, Australia, 2003-2014 
 
Note.       = 2003 DBFs;  = 2006 DBFs;      = 2014 DBFs; node size = aggregated 
number of biotechnology firms per year. 
  
 
Figure 2: Melbourne DBFs and their ties, 2006 and 2014: with local PROs and 
without  








Note: Dark grey circles = DBFs; light grey triangles = PROs; light grey squares = FIN; light grey diamonds = 
private bioscience firms; light grey hexagon = GOV; light grey trapeze = other 
 
Figure 3: Ties of Australian DBFs with domestic financial entities in 2003, 2006, and 
2014 
2003 2006 2014 
  
 
Note: Dark grey circles = DBFs; light grey squares = domestic FIN 
 
Figure 4: Aggregated DBF international collaborations, Australia, 2003-14 
 
Note.        = biotechnology firms;     = partner firms; node size = number of aggregated firms. Only 
international locations with 10 partners or more (greater than 1 percent of all partner organizations) between 












Note: Dark grey circles = DBFs; light grey circles = international DBFs; light grey diamonds = international 
private bioscience firms; light grey squares = international big pharma; light grey trapeze = international 
second-tier pharmaceutical firms  
 




Patent applications Number of patent applications captured in t+1; reflective of 
inventiveness 
Risk capital deal Dummy variable capturing whether a DBF was able to forge a risk 
capital deal in t+1 
Deal with Big Pharma Dummy variable capturing whether a DBF was able to strike a deal 
with a Big Pharma partner captured in t+1 
Independent variables 
AusIndustry grants Number of AusIndustry grants averaged over three years 
Collaborations Overall number of collaborations averaged over three years; 
reflective of degree centrality in the network 
Proportion of internat. collab. Ratio of international collaborative ties to the overall number of 
collaborations averaged over three years 
Network portfolio diversity B a        a a    
years 
Partner popularity A a  b   ab a  a  a   a DBF  a  a  
with other DBFs in the sample averaged over three years 
Domestic DBF collaborations Number of collaborations with other Australian DBFs averaged over 
three years 
R&D collaborations (overall, local, 
interstate, international) 
Number of (overall, local, interstate, or international) research and 
development collaborations averaged over three years 
Co-authorships (overall, local, 
interstate, international) 
Number of (overall, local, interstate, or international) co-authorships 
averaged over three years 
Financial collaborations (overall, 
local, interstate, international) 
Number of (overall, local, interstate, or international) financial 
collaborations averaged over three years 
International private bioscience 
collaborations 
Number of collaborations with international private bioscience firms 
averaged over three years 
Control variables 
JIF-weighted publications Number of publications weighted by JIF averaged over three years 
Academic founder Dummy variable capturing whether at least one of the founders of a 
DBF previously held a research position at a domestic PRO 
Age Age of a DBF measured in years since incorporation 
Listed Dummy variable capturing whether a firm is public (i.e., listed at the 
Australian Stock Exchange ASX) or private 
Size Dummy variable capturing the size of a DBF with (0) small 
biotechnology firms and (1) medium to large firms 
Diagnostic Dummy variable distinguishing diagnostic (1) from human 
therapeutic (0) biotechnology organizations 
Melbourne cluster Dummy capturing whether a DBF was located in the Melbourne 
cluster 
Sydney cluster Dummy capturing whether a DBF was located in the Sydney cluster 
Brisbane cluster Dummy capturing whether a DBF was located in the Brisbane 
cluster 
(Prior) patent applications Number of patent applications averaged over three years (t-2 to t) 
(Prior) risk capital deal Dummy variable capturing whether a DBF was able to forge a risk 
capital deal between t-2 and t 
(Prior) Big Pharma deal Dummy variable capturing whether a DBF was able to forge a Big 
Pharma deal between t-2 and t 
 
Table 2: GEE negative binomial regression models for patent applications 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE 
Age -0.006 -0.017 -0.027 -0.017 -0.027 -0.019 
Founder 0.038 -0.232 -0.036 -0.195 -0.061 -0.190 
Listed 0.806** -0.258 0.312 -0.309 0.246 -0.308 
Size 0.953** -0.209 0.457+ -0.240 0.430+ -0.235 
Diagnostic -0.405 -0.436 -0.292 -0.340 -0.368 -0.347 
Melbourne cluster -0.175 -0.332 0.077 -0.248 0.085 -0.272 
Sydney cluster 0.360 -0.393 0.525+ -0.284 0.563+ -0.293 
Brisbane cluster -0.675+ -0.36 -0.473 -0.347 -0.371 -0.374 
Prior patent applications    0.401** -0.067 0.355** -0.072 
Risk capital deal    -0.558* -0.235 -0.611** -0.225 
Big Pharma deal    0.296 -0.260 0.254 -0.243 
AusIndustry grants    0.255 -0.196 0.278 -0.218 
Collaborations    -0.015 -0.031 -0.024 -0.032 
Partner popularity    -0.021 -0.024 -0.020 -0.025 
Network portfolio diversity    0.491 -0.560 0.264 -0.514 
Proportion of international ties    0.133 -0.402 0.847+ -0.469 
Domestic DBF collaborations    0.060 -0.316 0.116 -0.298 
R&D collaborations    0.057 -0.046   
Local R&D collaborations       0.137+ -0.079 
Interstate R&D collaborations       0.183 -0.140 
International R&D collaborations       0.008 -0.059 
Co-authorships     0.153* -0.062     
Local co-authorships         0.200* -0.100 
Interstate co-authorships         0.291 -0.199 
International co-authorships         0.021 -0.137 
Financial collaborations    0.187+ -0.109   
Local financial collaborations       0.384* -0.195 
Interstate financial collaborations       0.248+ -0.130 
International financial collab.       -0.280 -0.322 
Constant -4.323** -0.946 -4.718** -0.848 -4.710** -0.831 
Year dummies included included included 
Observations 987 987 987 
Number of unique DBFs 175 175 175 
Wald chi2 128.34** 523.69** 554.99** 
Note: SE = cluster-robust standard errors; +p < 0.1; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01. 
  
 
Table 3: Logistic panel regression models of risk capital deals 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE 
Age 0.012 -0.030 -0.004 -0.031 -0.006 -0.026 
Founder 1.054** -0.348 1.017** -0.377 1.207** -0.403 
Listed 1.049* -0.414 1.097* -0.496 1.065* -0.478 
Size -0.044 -0.383 -0.351 -0.488 -0.250 -0.463 
Diagnostic -0.273 -0.423 0.060 -0.502 0.043 -0.470 
Melbourne cluster 0.370 -0.408 0.302 -0.424 0.745+ -0.407 
Sydney cluster 0.156 -0.458 0.040 -0.495 0.162 -0.477 
Brisbane cluster 0.552 -0.460 0.219 -0.532 0.625 -0.533 
Patent applications    0.138 -0.171 0.193 -0.137 
Prior risk capital deals    -0.246 -0.593 -0.182 -0.425 
Big Pharma deal    -0.031 -0.383 -0.084 -0.374 
AusIndustry grants    0.249 -0.531 0.396 -0.481 
Collaborations    -0.033 -0.058 -0.044 -0.067 
Partner popularity    -0.013 -0.036 -0.017 -0.035 
Network portfolio diversity    -0.446 -0.852 -0.802 -0.901 
Proportion of international ties    0.301 -1.007 0.455 -1.006 
Domestic DBF collaborations    1.284* -0.562 1.514** -0.458 
R&D collaborations    -0.052 -0.077   
Local R&D collaborations       -0.180 -0.168 
Interstate R&D collaborations       0.487+ -0.274 
International R&D collaborations       -0.198 -0.135 
Co-authorships     0.129 -0.11     
Local co-authorships         0.413* -0.198 
Interstate co-authorships         -0.351 -0.533 
International co-authorships         0.112 -0.264 
Financial collaborations    0.507** -0.158   
Local financial collaborations       0.216 -0.363 
Interstate financial collaborations       0.486* -0.232 
International financial collab.       0.759+ -0.446 
Constant -6.200** -1.152 -6.021** -1.202 -6.172** -1.276 
Year dummies included included included 
Observations 987 987 987 
Number of unique DBFs 175 175 175 
Log likelihood -207.89 -197.18 -192.53 
Wald chi2 41.03** 93.33** 179.16** 
Note: SE = cluster-robust standard errors; +p < 0.1; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01. 
  
 
Table 4: Logistic panel regression models of deals with Big Pharma 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE 
Age -0.001 -0.021 -0.007 -0.015 -0.001 -0.019 
Founder 0.516 -0.330 0.333 -0.271 0.445 -0.324 
Listed 1.523** -0.509 0.421 -0.508 0.328 -0.552 
Size 0.801+ -0.411 0.382 -0.380 0.413 -0.383 
Diagnostic -1.197* -0.585 -0.790 -0.521 -0.772 -0.551 
Melbourne cluster 0.232 -0.413 -0.054 -0.363 0.051 -0.419 
Sydney cluster -0.871 -0.582 -0.763 -0.563 -0.893 -0.581 
Brisbane cluster -0.154 -0.525 -0.399 -0.457 -0.181 -0.510 
Patent applications    0.171 -0.124 0.242+ -0.146 
Prior risk capital deals    0.778+ -0.422 0.775+ -0.432 
Big Pharma deal    0.376 -0.409 0.247 -0.423 
AusIndustry grants    -0.253 -0.435 -0.050 -0.452 
Collaborations    0.007 -0.038 -0.002 -0.039 
Partner popularity    0.059+ -0.031 0.056+ -0.031 
Network portfolio diversity    1.498 -0.942 1.055 -0.977 
Proportion of international ties    1.320* -0.651 1.704* -0.756 
Domestic DBF collaborations    -0.142 -0.398 -0.212 -0.418 
R&D collaborations    0.051 -0.057   
Local R&D collaborations       0.078 -0.155 
Interstate R&D collaborations       0.381 -0.236 
International R&D collaborations       -0.026 -0.091 
Co-authorships     0.113 -0.073     
Local co-authorships         0.199 -0.144 
Interstate co-authorships         0.124 -0.224 
International co-authorships         0.020 -0.225 
Financial collaborations    -0.071 -0.215   
Local financial collaborations       0.079 -0.321 
Interstate financial collaborations       -0.355 -0.262 
International financial collab.       0.298 -0.412 
Constant -5.267** -0.969 -6.373** -0.944 -6.459** -0.949 
Year dummies included included included 
Observations 987 987 987 
Number of unique DBFs 175 175 175 
Log likelihood -207.19 -195.11 -192.55 
Wald chi2 92.99** 212.77** 240.51** 
Note: SE = cluster-robust standard errors; +p < 0.1; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01. 
 
Appendix 
Table A1: Descriptive statistics and correlations 
    Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 Patent applications 0.374 1.016              
2 Risk capital deal 0.059  0.048             
3 Deal with Big Pharma 0.069  0.164 0.068            
4 Age 9.569 6.573 0.065 0.014 0.085           
5 Founder 0.660  -0.030 0.089 0.001 -0.189          
6 Listed 0.354  0.262 0.131 0.217 0.465 -0.148         
7 Size 0.178  0.334 0.075 0.218 0.270 -0.056 0.536        
8 Diagnostic 0.188  -0.088 -0.021 -0.090 -0.031 -0.031 -0.091 -0.082       
9 Melbourne cluster 0.370  0.043 0.032 0.107 0.097 -0.145 0.210 0.098 -0.090      
10 Sydney cluster 0.208  0.050 -0.011 -0.070 -0.011 0.067 -0.008 0.009 0.034 -0.392     
11 Brisbane cluster 0.175  -0.065 0.032 -0.020 -0.056 0.174 -0.073 0.001 -0.059 -0.353 -0.236    
12 (Prior) patent applications 0.489 0.885 0.484 0.130 0.221 0.125 -0.042 0.390 0.420 -0.127 0.071 0.063 -0.077   
13 (Prior) risk capital deal 0.252  0.096 0.143 0.155 -0.047 0.083 0.249 0.144 -0.119 0.149 -0.033 -0.016 0.178  
14 (Prior) Big Pharma deal 0.169  0.148 0.037 0.208 0.210 -0.047 0.345 0.355 -0.121 0.186 -0.145 -0.002 0.250 0.173 
15 AusIndustry grants 0.225 0.384 0.211 0.126 0.094 -0.104 0.067 0.147 0.260 -0.121 -0.058 0.038 0.081 0.266 0.261 
16 JIF-weighted publications 2.105 5.443 0.257 0.048 0.201 0.317 -0.055 0.324 0.351 -0.130 0.022 0.004 0.037 0.447 0.067 
17 Collaborations 6.802 7.162 0.290 0.067 0.244 0.387 -0.039 0.560 0.478 -0.015 0.145 -0.018 -0.047 0.376 0.201 
18 Network portfolio diversity 0.445 0.290 0.188 0.082 0.157 0.134 0.147 0.381 0.302 -0.186 0.135 -0.054 0.014 0.284 0.289 
19 Partner popularity 6.712 7.206 -0.033 0.040 -0.030 -0.256 0.154 -0.218 -0.117 -0.079 -0.012 -0.048 0.264 -0.051 0.033 
20 Prop. of internat. collab. 0.300 0.323 0.127 0.014 0.155 0.414 -0.140 0.535 0.363 0.142 0.122 -0.003 -0.111 0.215 0.028 
21 Domestic DBF collaborations 0.049 0.242 0.174 0.092 0.127 0.178 -0.068 0.167 0.224 -0.022 0.072 0.021 -0.049 0.257 0.153 
22 Internat. private bioscience collab. 1.767 3.022 0.147 0.028 0.145 0.372 -0.050 0.507 0.417 0.100 0.068 -0.038 0.008 0.211 0.054 
23 R&D collaborations 1.480 2.443 0.290 0.064 0.219 0.228 -0.061 0.461 0.350 -0.040 0.171 -0.038 -0.120 0.356 0.188 
24 Local R&D collaborations 0.542 0.918 0.215 0.050 0.163 0.173 0.009 0.309 0.259 -0.008 0.121 0.010 -0.086 0.266 0.167 
25 Interstate R&D collaborations 0.305 0.618 0.258 0.091 0.187 0.060 -0.035 0.370 0.276 -0.062 -0.017 0.007 -0.092 0.292 0.143 
26 International R&D collaborations 0.632 1.563 0.225 0.035 0.172 0.231 -0.086 0.394 0.286 -0.033 0.204 -0.068 -0.101 0.286 0.139 
27 Co-authorships 0.778 1.806 0.256 0.071 0.203 0.330 -0.009 0.364 0.367 -0.118 0.062 -0.015 0.029 0.399 0.074 
28 Local co-authorships 0.347 0.857 0.206 0.088 0.192 0.327 0.008 0.260 0.276 -0.113 0.050 0.003 -0.021 0.313 0.125 
29 Interstate co-authorships 0.214 0.630 0.237 0.020 0.147 0.251 0.005 0.329 0.338 -0.080 0.048 -0.038 0.065 0.330 0.046 
30 International co-authorships 0.218 0.718 0.189 0.054 0.152 0.219 -0.036 0.316 0.296 -0.091 0.054 -0.008 0.040 0.341 -0.004 
31 Financial collaborations 0.653 0.952 0.075 0.139 0.064 -0.020 0.192 0.073 0.085 -0.185 0.105 -0.062 0.135 0.113 0.500 
32 Local financial collaborations 0.292 0.528 0.005 0.077 0.044 -0.117 0.194 -0.075 -0.032 -0.206 0.186 -0.061 0.016 0.034 0.340 
33 Interstate financial collaborations 0.293 0.607 0.125 0.133 0.038 0.027 0.124 0.136 0.133 -0.077 -0.019 -0.067 0.187 0.161 0.396 
34 International financial collab. 0.068 0.263 -0.026 0.045 0.057 0.101 0.020 0.102 0.064 -0.075 0.050 0.055 0.023 -0.031 0.211 
Note: N = 987 firm-year observations for all variables; all correlations coefficients larger than .062 in absolute values are significant (p < 0.05) 
 
Table A1: Descriptive statistics and correlations (contd.) 
    14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 
15 AusIndustry grants 0.106               
16 JIF-weighted publications 0.223 0.121              
17 Collaborations 0.411 0.209 0.476             
18 Network portfolio diversity 0.244 0.255 0.268 0.393            
19 Partner popularity -0.097 0.314 -0.069 -0.176 -0.049           
20 Prop. of internat. collab. 0.340 -0.060 0.154 0.500 0.268 -0.380          
21 Domestic DBF collaborations 0.122 0.071 0.163 0.271 0.134 -0.034 0.059         
22 Internat. private bioscience collab. 0.419 0.052 0.239 0.667 0.203 -0.230 0.550 0.093        
23 R&D collaborations 0.266 0.160 0.199 0.587 0.304 -0.112 0.296 0.327 0.313       
24 Local R&D collaborations 0.225 0.151 0.222 0.403 0.277 -0.062 0.079 0.286 0.153 0.753      
25 Interstate R&D collaborations 0.219 0.184 0.190 0.424 0.316 -0.063 0.135 0.192 0.244 0.596 0.375     
26 International R&D collaborations 0.196 0.090 0.106 0.513 0.188 -0.114 0.363 0.268 0.302 0.885 0.441 0.316    
27 Co-authorships 0.266 0.086 0.904 0.506 0.283 -0.096 0.193 0.166 0.296 0.221 0.222 0.207 0.133   
28 Local co-authorships 0.246 0.069 0.706 0.424 0.260 -0.078 0.113 0.217 0.225 0.238 0.288 0.146 0.145 0.829  
29 Interstate co-authorships 0.200 0.082 0.716 0.375 0.224 -0.067 0.133 0.089 0.219 0.063 0.047 0.189 -0.004 0.793 0.458 
30 International co-authorships 0.201 0.064 0.803 0.436 0.205 -0.088 0.233 0.081 0.284 0.217 0.172 0.182 0.166 0.830 0.491 
31 Financial collaborations 0.094 0.211 0.086 0.167 0.320 0.046 -0.063 0.024 0.011 0.056 0.070 0.077 0.016 0.056 0.119 
32 Local financial collaborations 0.030 0.145 0.047 0.033 0.251 0.091 -0.157 0.013 -0.107 -0.019 -0.004 0.038 -0.043 0.025 0.086 
33 Interstate financial collaborations 0.045 0.230 0.094 0.179 0.238 0.031 -0.056 0.016 0.053 0.099 0.120 0.087 0.049 0.065 0.108 
34 International financial collab. 0.174 -0.059 0.000 0.125 0.105 -0.088 0.215 0.022 0.131 0.012 -0.019 0.000 0.030 0.001 0.008 
Note: N = 987 firm-year observations for all variables; all correlations coefficients larger than .062 in absolute values are significant (p < 0.05) 
 
Table A1: Descriptive statistics and correlations (contd.) 
    29 30 31 32 33 
30 International co-authorships 0.570     
31 Financial collaborations 0.009 -0.010    
32 Local financial collaborations -0.007 -0.034 0.697   
33 Interstate financial collaborations 0.042 -0.001 0.760 0.148  
34 International financial collab. -0.048 0.037 0.466 0.172 0.147 
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